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MECHANISMS IN  
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY
Tudor M. Baetu
1. Introduction
While mechanistic explanations are by no means a novelty in biology (see Part I on historical 
perspectives on mechanisms), their appearance dating back to Harvey’s discovery of the blood’s 
circulation and Descartes’ mechanistic manifesto touted in The Treatise of Man, it is only in the 
second half of the twentieth century, with the rise of molecular biology, that mechanistic think-
ing overtakes the whole of biology, becoming the predominant type of explanation. Explaining 
biological phenomena as the effects of molecular mechanisms turned out to have a marked 
influence on philosophy of science on two accounts. First, it motivated a renewed interest in 
mechanistic explanation, providing philosophers with a wealth of examples that didn’t quite 
fit the deductive-nomological approach promoted by the logical positivists (Wimsatt 1976). 
Second, molecular biology motivated a shift in the way we think about mechanisms, fostering 
a “new” mechanistic philosophy. Unlike the “old” mechanistic philosophy, which was closely 
linked to the theory of classical mechanics and the clockwork view of the world, the “new” 
mechanistic philosophy had to come to terms with the notion that most biological mechanisms 
do not look and behave like eighteenth-century automata, but are much more complex and 
“noisier” systems composed of hundreds, thousands, and even millions of non-fixed, non-rigid 
parts whose behavior is nevertheless sufficiently constrained both by the properties of the parts 
and by the spatio-temporal organizational features of the system as to reliably produce and 
sustain biological phenomena and, ultimately, life itself.
2. What is molecular biology?
Molecular biology is the field of scientific investigation concerned with the molecular basis of 
biological activity. Its most significant achievements are the elucidation of the mechanisms of 
replication, transcription, and translation in the 1950s and 60s, providing an explanation of how 
cells replicate their genetic material and how genes are expressed as proteins that contribute to 
the phenotype of the organism. Molecular biologists quickly extended their inquiries to other 
biological phenomena, most notably gene expression regulation, the cell cycle, and cellular sign-
aling. By the 1970s, molecular biology gained a firm footing in many other fields of biology, with 
developmental biology, immunology, neurology, and microbiology “going molecular.” In this 
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respect, molecular biology can be viewed as providing the guidelines of a general explanatory 
approach which I shall explore in more detail in the subsequent sections of this chapter.
Historically, molecular biology was born from the convergence of work in genetics, bio-
chemistry, and physical chemistry in an attempt to figure out how genes determine phenotypes 
(Carlson 1967; Darden 1991, 2006a; Fox Keller 2000; Kay 1993; Morange 1998; Schaffner 
1993).1 Such questions fall outside the immediate explanatory scope of classical genetics, which 
is mainly concerned with the transmission of inherited traits (Morgan 1935; Moss 2003; Waters 
1994). They also fall outside the immediate scope of biochemistry, which focuses predomi-
nantly on metabolic activities (e.g., the chemical reactions taking place during glycolysis or 
protein synthesis), as well as that of physical chemistry, which is concerned with the inter- and 
intramolecular forces shaping the tridimensional structure and the physicochemical properties of 
macromolecules (Baetu 2012a; Darden 2006b; Morange 2002; Olby 1994).
It is customary to distinguish molecular biology from related fields on the basis of its specific 
techniques of investigation revolving around the “cloning” of genetic material (creating copies 
of DNA fragments), along with techniques required to detect (e.g., electrophoresis), sequence 
(e.g., chain-termination sequencing), amplify (e.g., polymerase chain reaction, or PCR), and 
manipulate (e.g., site-directed mutagenesis) genetic material, many of which rely on the under-
standing of the mechanisms of replication, transcription, and translation which are at the core of 
molecular biology (Astbury 1961; Waters 2008). These techniques involve experimental inter-
ventions at the resolution of individual nucleotides—and, via the alteration of codon sequences, 
of individual amino-acids in a peptide sequence—thus tracking the flow of information within 
the cell, revealing the functional role of sequence motifs such as promoters, codons, and zinc-
fingers relative to the operation of molecular mechanisms, and providing an understanding of 
how changes in the sequence of various molecular components result in changes in the opera-
tion of mechanisms and their ability to produce or sustain biological phenomena. 
It should be noted, however, that molecular biology was and continues to be part of a highly 
integrated cluster of fields. Molecular biologists routinely rely on data, theoretical assumptions, 
and formal and experimental techniques from genetics, biochemistry, physical chemistry, cell 
biology, microbiology, statistics, epidemiology, systems biology, systematics, and many others. 
At the same time, scientists in other fields, from evolutionary biology to psychiatry, rely on 
explanatory strategies and experimental techniques inspired from molecular biology. As a result, 
our current understanding of the molecular basis of biological activity integrates findings from a 
wide variety of fields within and outside biology. 
3. The nature of molecular mechanisms
In his celebrated essay What is Life?, Erwin Schrödinger tackles the difficult question of the 
origin of order in biological systems. He argues that biological systems escape entropy because 
there is information in the system telling it how to assemble itself in an organized fashion. 
On this account, information is a source of order in what would have otherwise been a ther-
modynamically disordered system. Genes would be the repositories of information, which is 
propagated throughout the cell by a series of deterministic mechanisms that preserve order. This 
view, predating the major discoveries of molecular biology, endures until today, to the point 
that some philosophers define molecular biology as the study of the mechanisms of information 
propagation within cells (Darden 2006a, 2006b; Morange 1998). 
Schrödinger’s order-generating information was eventually identified with genetic infor-
mation, while its propagation throughout the cell by means of deterministic mechanisms 
came to be known as genetic determinism. The best illustration is the “genetic program” 
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view popularized by François Jacob (1976) and Jacques Monod (1972); for a philosophical 
discussion, see Baetu (2012b). According to this view, information is unidirectionally propa-
gated via the mechanisms of transcription and translation to peptide sequences, which in turn 
determine the tridimensional shape of proteins via the folding of α-helices, ß-sheets, and other 
secondary structures, itself determining the specificity of binding to other molecules accord-
ing to a lock-and-key or induced fit model, thus directing the flow of chemical reactions 
underpinning metabolic and signaling pathways as well as the self-assembly of the various 
supramolecular structures that constitute the living cell. 
While immensely popular in the 1970s and still echoing today, this view is in fact a 
special case of a more general concept in molecular biology, namely that of specific bind-
ing (Kupiec 2009; Morange 1998). Specificity of binding is assumed to determine not only 
the preferential pairing of nucleotides in complementary strands of nucleic acids during 
replication and transcription or between codons and aminoacyl-tRNAs during translation, 
but also virtually any single activity related to the operation of molecular mechanisms, 
including enzyme-substrate interactions, the recognition of extracellular ligands by cell-
surface receptors, the binding of transcriptional factors to particular DNA sequences, the 
self-assembly of microtubules and ribosomes, etc. Specificity is determined by chemical 
affinity, which is typically measured as the average life span of a supramolecular complex in 
a given chemical environment. When molecules form stable, long-lasting complexes likely 
to have a marked impact on biological activity, their binding is said to be specific; when the 
complexes are short-lived, their binding is said to be non-specific. Thus, order-generating 
information is not restricted to the genome, but is in fact manifest in every single specific 
molecular interaction taking place in the cell. 
Less appreciated by the general public is the fact that binding specificity is an “analog,” or 
stochastic concept (Rao et  al. 2002). Any given molecule always interacts with many other 
molecules, for some with stronger and for others with weaker affinity, such that specific bind-
ing invariably occurs against the “noisy” background of myriad non-specific interactions. 
Furthermore, it is not uncommon that the same macromolecule can bind with relatively high 
specificity not only one, but many other molecules (e.g., most transcriptional factors can bind 
with variable, but relatively high specificity several related DNA sequences).2 By contrast, 
genetic determinism assumes an idealized limit case, a “noise-free” or “digital” specificity prop-
agating itself throughout the cell without significant distortion as the inevitable result of the 
expression of genomic sequences.
“Digital” specificity idealizations are still ubiquitous in the qualitative descriptions of 
molecular biology. While there are epistemic benefits associated with such idealizations, most 
notably increased intelligibility, the truth is that, until very recently, molecular biologists had 
no other choice but to idealize. Traditionally, molecular techniques rely on the amplification 
of the properties, states, and activities of molecular components up to an unequivocal threshold 
of detection. This is achieved by studying millions of cells in bulk over (chemically speaking) 
long periods of time, which means ignoring both time fluctuations, as well as differences from 
one cell to another. Yet the underlying biochemistry dictates that most molecular activities 
are chemical reactions controlled by the concentrations, states, and locations of the various 
molecules involved. If these parameters are not identical in all cells, there will be fluctuations 
from one cell to another with respect to quantitative and dynamic aspects of the operation and 
output of mechanisms. Furthermore, chemical reactions are intrinsically stochastic since they 
rely on random microscopic events that govern how fast reactions occur and in what order. 
For years, it was assumed that although stochastic fluctuations are bound to occur, they are 
biologically irrelevant “background noise” cells keep to a minimum. Thus, it was and often still 
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is customary to assume that what is true of a large population of cells can be safely extrapolated 
to individual cells within that population. In turn, this justifies the belief that, on average, the 
same mechanism, following the sequence of chemical events, is synchronously operating in all 
cells of the same type subjected to the same conditions. 
In contrast with this view, recent single-cell experiments revealed that stochastic fluctua-
tions are non-negligible, meaning that cells must rely on noise-suppressing mechanisms, such 
as negative feedback and DNA “proof-reading” (Elowitz et al. 2002). It also turned out that 
stochasticity itself can be biologically relevant and is in fact used as a means for generating 
diversity and histological-level patterns. For example, probabilistic biases in the distribution 
of adhesion proteins suffice to generate the right amount of twisting in the developing gut, 
while stochastic gene expression is responsible for generating blue- to ultraviolet-sensitive 
cells ratios in the Drosophila eye; for discussion, see Baetu (2015b), (Heams 2011), and Merlin 
(2011). The growing realization that many mechanisms in biology are stochastic motivated 
a more careful investigation of the extent to which regularity is a distinctive characteristic of 
mechanisms (Andersen 2012; Darden 2008; DesAutels 2011), with some authors emphasizing 
the highly irregular (Bogen 2005) and even the singular nature of some mechanisms (Glennan 
2010, 2011). The issues of stochasticity, regularity, and singular causation are discussed in 
more detail in Chapters 10–13. More general implications for theories of causation can be 
found in Hall (2004) and Psillos (2004).
Specific binding is clearly responsible for generating some supramolecular structures, from 
the recruitment of polymerase complexes to the self-assembly of proteasomes and microtubules; 
furthermore, techniques like in vitro translation or PCR would be impossible without spe-
cific binding. Nevertheless, specificity is sensitive to the effective concentrations of molecular 
components, with the “background noise” of non-specific interactions increasing for low copy 
numbers of molecules. This observation led to a questioning about whether specific binding is 
the exclusive origin of order in biological systems. 
The traditional model, inherited from early twentieth-century biochemistry, is the cell 
as a “bag of enzymes.” According to this admittedly idealized model, the spatio-temporal 
organization of molecular mechanisms, from the dynamics of activities to the assembly of 
supramolecular structures, is driven by specificity of binding in the context of a free diffusion 
solution chemistry. In short, were it not for differential binding specificities, the molecules 
inside a cell would display the same amount of order as sugar dissolved in a glass of water. 
This model turned out to be unsatisfactory. Molecular mechanisms operate within an intra-
cellular environment filled with other molecules. Macromolecular crowding functions as 
an excluded volume effect, favoring the aggregation of macromolecules while drastically 
decreasing the rate of any diffusion-dependent molecular activity (Ellis 2001). This strongly 
suggests that the intracellular environment cannot consist of a disordered collection of mol-
ecules, as this would result in the proliferation of noise-generating non-specific interactions 
at the expense of order-generating specific ones. Instead, it must be structured in such a 
way as to bring in close proximity proteins and their ligands, thus favoring the specific 
chemical interactions required for the operation of molecular mechanisms (Hochachka 1999; 
Mathews 1993). However, if this is the case—and recent evidence supports this conclusion, 
e.g. the effects of nuclear architecture on transcription (Cremer and Cremer 2001)—then 
the tridimensional structure of the cell and tissue organization are also a source of order, 
functioning as a scaffold constraining the behavior of molecular mechanisms by favoring 
some activities while suppressing others. This “return to holism” in molecular biology did 
not go unnoticed in philosophy of biology, motivating a renewed attack on genetic deter-
minism on the grounds that gene expression is a stochastic process (Kupiec 2009), that 
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information is distributed throughout the cell ( Jablonka 2001), and that genes alone—or for 
that matter the properties of individual molecules, such as their binding affinities—cannot 
fully account for phenotype and development (Dupré 2010; Griffiths and Stotz 2006, 2013; 
Oyama et al. 2001).
One final twist in the story of the molecular basis of biological activity is the “systemic turn” 
in biology. Its impact on the way we think about mechanisms is discussed in Chapter 27. The 
present discussion will focus on one of the many findings that prompted this turn, namely the 
realization that molecular mechanisms operate in a less modular fashion than initially thought. 
Molecular biologists often work under the assumption that mechanisms amount to discrete 
functional modules organized hierarchically, serially or in parallel. While useful as a heuristic of 
discovery, the modularity assumption came to be questioned by a growing body of evidence 
revealing that distinct mechanisms responsible for distinct phenomena share mechanistic compo-
nents. Notoriously, intracellular signaling pathways and gene regulatory mechanisms invariably 
intersect at some point, forming widespread molecular networks (Davidson and Levine 2005). 
It has therefore been proposed that many molecular mechanisms are in fact inextricably inter-
locked into vast networks of partially overlapping mechanisms, where the sharing of mechanistic 
components is thought to play a role in the fine-tuning of quantitative-dynamic aspects of the 
phenomena produced by these mechanisms (Barabási and Oltvai 2004). In some cases, math-
ematical models were able to account for minute discrepancies between the predicted and 
observed outcomes by taking into consideration interference from overlapping mechanisms, 
thus providing some evidence for the biological significance of non-modular modes of organi-
zation; for philosophical discussion and references to the original scientific literature, see Baetu 
(2015b); Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2010, 2011). 
In recent philosophical debates, modularity is often understood along the lines of “independ-
ent disruptability” stating that the overall effect of a causal system can be decomposed into a set 
of independent causal contributions attributable to each of the constituents of the system (Steel 
2007; Woodward 2002). The systemic turn in biology prompted some authors to reject causal 
modularity (Bogen 2004; Mitchell 2009), and even interpret it as a vindication of a more holistic 
approach defended by the old organicist school of thought (Nicholson 2013); for a historical 
discussion of mechanism vs. organicism, see Chapter 5. It is interesting, however, to note that if 
molecular mechanisms are constrained by higher-level cellular and histological structures, then 
significant forms of modularity must prevail in virtue of the physical partitioning of biochemi-
cal reactions (Callebaut and Rasskin-Gutman 2005; Hartwell et al. 1999). If so, the relevant 
issue is not whether cells and organisms are organized in a modular fashion, but the extent to 
which molecular mechanisms, as described in biology textbooks, amount to functional or causal 
modules (Baetu in press; Woodward 2010).
4. Mechanistic explanations in molecular biology
One of the explicit aims of molecular biology is to provide a reductive explanation of biological 
phenomena in terms of molecular mechanisms. It is therefore crucial to investigate more closely 
the notion of mechanistic explanation: how do mechanisms explain? 
According to the ontic view, mechanistic explanations are objective features of the world. 
To explain a phenomenon is to fit it into the causal structure of the world (Craver 2007). 
The advantages of this view is that it eliminates the subjective notion of understanding while 
emphasizing the tight link between explanation and the ability to control effects by interven-
ing on their causes. Notwithstanding, most philosophers prefer an epistemic view, according to 
which mechanistic explanations are step-by-step descriptions of how mechanisms produce the 
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phenomena for which they are responsible, although some authors point out that both ontic 
and epistemic considerations contribute to a successful mechanistic explanation (Illari 2013). For 
treatment of ontic vs. epistemic conceptions, see Chapter 16.
In one version of the epistemic view, descriptions of mechanisms, in words or by means of 
diagrams, convey an intuitive understanding consisting in simulating the working of mecha-
nisms in our imagination (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005) or by analogy with more common 
types of activities (Machamer 2004). While imagination is indispensable for our ability to learn 
about and understand molecular mechanisms, equating mechanistic explanation with intuitive 
understanding can be problematic. For one thing, the simulations we perform in our minds are 
heavily idealized. Detailed quantitative aspects are absent, while known facts are distorted to 
outline a deterministic sequence of events tracking the fate of single molecules (a more accurate 
biochemical description would be that of a series of back-and-forth equilibria involving popula-
tions of molecules bumping into each other), each assumed to be rigidly structured (ignoring 
the fact that molecules “breathe,” vibrating and cycling through various configurations), as they 
modify one another to bring about a change from an initial to a final state of affairs (thus mask-
ing an underlying variety of chemical pathways that contribute to the same final state, as well as 
ignoring alternate pathways where mechanisms fail to contribute to the output). 
Such idealizations are due to the fact that intuitive understanding relies on analogies with 
macroscopic mechanisms more familiar to us. In contrast, examples of mechanistic explana-
tions from the sciences show that the working entities of a mechanism—that is, the parts of the 
mechanism engaged in the operation of the mechanism (Machamer et al. 2000)—span multiple 
levels of composition, thus supporting the notion that biological mechanisms combine a wide 
variety of activities associated with different levels of composition, from push-pull mechani-
cal interactions to chemical reactions and thermodynamic processes (Craver 2007; Craver and 
Darden 2013; Darden 2006b; also Chapter 14 in the present volume). There is even evidence 
that some molecular mechanisms harness the quirks of quantum mechanics (Ball 2011); for a 
philosophical discussion, see Barwich (2015). Arguably, an intuitive understanding of chemi-
cal equilibria, thermodynamic processes, and quantum mechanics by means of analogies with 
macroscopic mechanisms is problematic, as many of these concepts defy our imagination and are 
best captured by a rather complex mathematical formalism. 
This brings us to a third view meant to reflect a relatively recent quantitative turn in molecu-
lar biology, namely an understanding mediated by evidence from the testing of mathematical 
models aimed at demonstrating that mechanisms can in principle produce the phenomena for 
which they are responsible in close approximation of detailed quantitative measurements (Baetu 
2015b; Bechtel 2012; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2011; Braillard 2010; Brigandt 2013; Gross 
2015; also Chapters 20 and 27). This view also qualifies as epistemic, albeit the understanding 
is more of a theoretical than an intuitive-imaginative nature, as it involves showing how phe-
nomena are consequences of explicit rules and assumptions about the operation of mechanisms. 
A more comprehensive treatment of representations of mechanisms in general can be found in 
Chapter 18. Models of mechanisms are discussed in more detail in Chapter 17.
It is interesting to note that mechanistic explanations do not automatically preclude a role 
for generalizations and regularities in biology. The ability of some mechanisms to regularly pro-
duce a phenomenon accounts for some of the generalizations observable in the biological world 
(Glennan 2002; Illari and Williamson 2012; Machamer et al. 2000). For example, mechanistic 
constraints can explain why some evolutionary outcomes are more probable than others, and 
allow for predictions in specific lineages (Baetu 2012c), while the reliance on exemplar organism 
models supports the notion that general patterns shared by a large number of species exist and play 
an important role in guiding research (Ankeny 2001; Bolker 1995; Schaffner 2001; Weber 2005). 
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Conversely, the behavior of mechanistic parts is often characterized by invariant 
change-relating generalizations (Glennan 1996, 2002; Woodward 2002, 2010). Likewise, 
mathematical modeling presupposes a set of rules specifying how mechanisms change from 
one state to another, where some of these rules are laws borrowed from chemistry and 
physics (Schaffner 1993; Weber 2005). The current tendency to complement experimental 
research with mathematical modeling is also responsible for reviving the notion that mathe-
matical or, more often, computational derivation contributes to the mechanistic explanation 
by demonstrating that certain aspects of a phenomenon are the logical consequence of the 
rules governing the operation of the mechanism. These considerations suggest a rather com-
plicated relationship between mechanisms and regularities in molecular biology, whereby 
mechanisms both rely on regularities governing the behavior of their components and are 
themselves responsible for generating novel regularities, typically under the form of recur-
rent or reproducible phenomena.
Another issue  that requires clarification concerns the completeness of mechanistic expla-
nations. This issue is closely linked to the more general problem of how mechanisms are 
discovered (Chapter 19). In this chapter, I will focus on questions about the levels of com-
position at which mechanistic explanations bottom-out and top-off—that is, the optimal 
resolution of detail at which mechanisms should be described and the extent to which mecha-
nisms act as independent modules that can produce (and therefore explain) the phenomena 
for which they are responsible when separated from the systems in which they are embedded.3 
The decomposition of biological systems reveals a hierarchical organization, with lower-level 
components organized as mechanisms underlying higher-level components (Bechtel 2006; 
Bechtel and Richardson 2010; Craver 2007). It might therefore be tempting to conclude 
that a more complete explanation can be achieved by investigating the components of a 
mechanism to reveal the finer-grained sub-mechanisms responsible for their properties and 
activities, as well as understanding how the mechanism fits in the context of progressively 
more comprehensive systems of mechanisms. Nonetheless, even though such investiga-
tions are bound to generate new knowledge—for instance, by explaining why mechanistic 
components have the properties they have or by providing the structural details necessary 
to intervene on these components and their properties—they cannot guarantee explana-
tory completeness. Assuming that the primary objective of a mechanistic explanation is to 
demonstrate causation—that is, show how an organized system of parts produces a specific 
phenomenon—then whether a mechanistic explanation is complete is a matter of providing 
evidence that parts having the properties and organization specified in the explanation can and 
do produce the phenomenon of interest.4 This kind of evidence is generated by attempts to 
build the mechanism in vitro using reconstitution experiments, in vivo using the techniques 
of genetic engineering and synthetic biology, and in silico by testing mathematical models, 
as well as more indirectly, by assessing the ability to correctly foresee and correct side-effects 
of treatments and other technological applications based on mechanistic explanations (Baetu 
2015a; Craver and Darden 2013; Morange 2009; Weber 2005). 
Another way of looking at the issue of explanatory completeness is from a pragmatic stand-
point. There are many ways in which a mechanistic explanation is useful to the scientist, and 
the purpose will determine when the explanation is deemed to be complete (Craver and Darden 
2013). The main advantage of a pragmatic stance is that it can accommodate seemingly conflict-
ing evaluations. For instance, if one seeks to gain control over the phenomenon of interest, then 
the explanation should focus on the manipulable components of the actual mechanism respon-
sible for the phenomenon, such as gene and protein sequences (Craver 2006; Waters 2007); if 
prediction is the main goal, then the focus will fall on showing how changes in the components 
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of a mechanism result in changes in the phenomenon produced by the mechanism (Cartwright 
2002; Woodward 2010); if one seeks intelligibility, be it for didactic purposes or to reveal 
general patterns, then abstracting or even idealizing may be necessary (Levy 2014). 
5. Conclusion
Molecular biology was undoubtedly the most influential field of biological research in the second 
half of the twentieth century, with hardly any branch of biology left untouched by the long-
reaching arm of the molecular revolution. At the same time, it is equally important to realize that 
molecular biology itself changed over time as a result of interactions with other fields, from its ori-
gins as interdisciplinary research in genetics, biochemistry, and physical chemistry, to its subsequent 
integration of ideas from cell and developmental biology, to its current interactions with synthetic, 
systems biology, and nanoscience. From a philosophical point of view, advances in molecular biol-
ogy prompted an inquiry about scientific explanation and the nature of biological mechanisms. 
Under the impetus of the elucidation of the mechanisms of genome replication and expression, 
molecular mechanisms were initially idealized as thoroughly deterministic devices propagating 
genetic information. This deterministic conception with a strong reductionistic flavor gave way to 
a more realistic interpretation endorsed by most molecular biologists today, namely that of molec-
ular mechanisms as deterministic systems with noise, where the spatio-temporal organization of 
mechanisms is generated not only by specificity of binding (an important part of which is genetic 
information), but also by cellular and other supramolecular organization constraints.
Notes
1 Among these authors, some take the official date of birth of molecular biology to coincide with the 
coining of the term by Warren Weaver in 1938 (Kay 1993; Olby 1994), while others postpone it until 
the elucidation of the structure of DNA in 1953 and the emergence of the modern concept of genetic 
information (Darden 2006a, 2006b).
2 There are many reasons why molecular interactions are “noisy.” Organic molecules can assume multiple 
stable configurations, each characterized by its distinct affinities; for instance, spontaneous mutations can 
occur via the tautomerization of nucleotides. Such variability is expected to be even more pronounced 
in macromolecules such as proteins, which can fold in a variety of configurations. Binding itself deforms 
molecules, thus altering their affinities and generating rather hard-to-predict phenomena such as alloste-
rism and cooperative binding. Finally, new discoveries suggest that some proteins are unstructured and 
assume different folding configurations depending on the partners with which they interact. For refer-
ences and philosophical discussion, see Kupiec (2009).
3 In many respects, these issues are a continuation of an earlier debate about reductionism in biology. 
While some philosophers have argued that the best explanations in biology are those bottoming out at a 
molecular level (Rosenberg 2006; Waters 1994), others replied that descriptions at higher levels of com-
position are needed to account for organizational features of biological systems (Laubichler and Wagner 
2001) or to enhance intelligibility (Kitcher 1984).
4 Some physicists proposed that biological explanations are likely to bottom-out at a molecular level because at 
this size scale the mechanical, electrostatic, chemical, and thermal energies of objects have similar magnitudes. 
The convergence of energy values means that mechanical, electrical, and chemical energy can be converted 
into one another, which can explain some of the most fundamental properties of living things, such as their 
ability to convert food (chemical energy) into motion (mechanical energy). Furthermore, thermal energy 
(random molecular collisions) may quite literally “kick start” molecular mechanisms, thus explaining their 
ability to work autonomously and spontaneously. In contrast, mechanical forces at macroscopic scales or 
binding forces stabilizing sub-molecular structures such as atoms are largely insensitive to thermal fluctua-
tions at room/body temperature, and therefore phenomena such as spontaneous activation, self-assembly, or 
change of shape are impossible (Hoffmann 2012; Philips and Quake 2006). This suggests that there is some-
thing objectively special about the molecular level in the sense that only molecules, as opposed to atoms or 
macroscopic objects, have the kind of properties required by mechanistic explanations in biology.
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